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Abstract 
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dioxide.  The most successful air pollution regulation is associated with a modest and statistically 
insignificant  decline  in  infant  mortality.    However,  the  water  pollution  regulations  had  no 
observable effect. Overall, these results contradict the conventional wisdom that environmental 
quality is a deterministic function of income and underscore the role of institutions and politics.   
 
JEL Codes: H2, Q5, Q2, O1, R5 
Keywords: Air pollution; Water pollution; Benefits of environmental regulations; India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Greenstone: MIT Department of Economics, E52-359, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 (e-mail: 
mgreenst@mit.edu)  Hanna: Harvard Kennedy School, 79 JFK Street (Mailbox 26), Cambridge, MA 02138 and 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development; (e-mail: 
Rema_Hanna@ksg.harvard.edu). We thank Samuel Stolper for truly outstanding research assistance.  In addition, 
we thank Joseph Shapiro and Abigail Friedman for excellent research assistance. Funding from the MIT Energy 
Initiative  is  gratefully  acknowledged.  The  analysis  was  conducted  while  Hanna  was  a  fellow  at  the  Science 
Sustainability Program at Harvard University.  The research reported in this paper was not the result of a for-pay 
consulting relationship.  Further, neither of the authors nor their respective institutions have a financial interest in the 
topic of the paper which might constitute a conflict of interest.  Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907924
	 ﾠ 2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a paucity of evidence about the efficacy of environmental regulation in developing 
countries.  However, this question is important for at least two reasons.
1  First, "local" pollutant 
concentrations are exceedingly high in many developing countries and they impose substantial 
health  costs,  including  shortened  lives  (Chen,  Ebenstein,  Greenstone,  and  Li  2011).  Thus, 
understanding  the  most  efficient  ways  to  reduce  local  pollution  could  significantly  improve 
wellbeing in developing countries.  Second, the Copenhagen Accord makes it clear that it is up to 
individual countries to devise and enforce the regulations necessary to achieve their national 
commitments to combat global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  Since most of 
the growth in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is projected to occur in developing countries, 
such  as  India  and  China,  the  planet's  wellbeing  rests  on  the  ability  of  these  countries  to 
successfully enact and enforce environmental regulations. 
  India provides a compelling setting to explore the efficacy of environmental regulations 
in  a  developing  country  for  several  reasons.    First,  India's  population  of  nearly  1.2  billion 
accounts for about 17 percent of the planet's population.  Second, the country is experiencing 
rapid economic growth of about 6.4 percent annually over the last two decades, which is placing 
significant pressure on the environment.  For example, Figure 1, Panel A demonstrates that 
ambient particulate matter concentrations in India are five times the level of concentrations in the 
United  States  (while  China's  are  seven  times  the  U.S.  level)  in  the  most  recent  years  with 
comparable data, while Figure 1, Panel B shows that water pollution concentrations in India are 
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1 There is a large literature measuring the impact of environmental regulations on air quality, with many of them 
finding that significant regulation-induced reductions in pollution concentrations in the United States.  See, for 
example, Chay and Greenstone (2003 and 2005), Greenstone (2003), Greenstone (2004), Henderson (1996), Hanna 
and Oliva (2010), and so forth.  However, given the institutional differences that exist between the United States and 
many developing countries, it is not clear that knowledge on what “works” in the United States is necessarily 
relevant in other contexts.	 ﾠ	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also higher.  Third, India has a surprisingly rich history of environmental regulations that dates 
back to the 1970s, providing a rare opportunity to answer these questions with extensive panel 
data.
2  Finally, India remains below the income levels at which the Environmental Kuznets curve 
literature predicts that pollution concentrations turn downward (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 
1995; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; Selden and Song, 1994; Stern and Common, 2001; 
Copland and Taylor, 2004), implying that it is at a stage of development where economic growth 
trumps environmental concerns.  Consequently, taking the predictions of these models at face 
value, it may be reasonable to expect that most of the environmental policies implemented to 
date have been ineffective. 
  This paper presents a systematic evaluation of India’s environmental regulations.  The 
analysis is conducted with a new city-level panel data file for the years 1986-2007 that we 
constructed from data on air pollution, water pollution, environmental regulations, and infant 
mortality in India.  The air pollution data cover about 140 cities, while the water pollution data 
comprises  information  from  424  cities  (162  rivers).    Neither  the  government  nor  other 
researchers  have  ever  assembled  a  city-level  panel  database  of  India's  anti-pollution  laws.  
Furthermore,  we  are  unaware  of  a  comparable  data  set  in  any  other  developing  country.  
Additionally,  we  believe  that  this  is  the  first  paper  to  relate  infant  mortality  rates  to 
environmental regulations in a developing country context.
3   
We considered two key air pollution policies—the Supreme Court Action Plans and the 
Mandated  Catalytic  Converters—that  centered  on  stemming  both  industrial  and  vehicular 
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2 Previous papers have compiled data sets for a cross-section of cities or a panel for one or two cities.  A few notable 
papers that focus on a particular city include: Foster and Kumar (2008; 2009), which examines the effect of CNG 
policy in Delhi; Takeuchi, Cropper, and Bento (2007), which studies the impact of automobile policies in Mumbai; 
Davis (2008), which looks at the effect of driving restrictions on air quality in Mexico; and Hanna and Oliva (2011), 
which explores the effects of a refinery closure in Mexico City.   
3 See Chay and Greenstone (2003) for the relationship between infant mortality and the Clean Air Act in the United 
States.  Burgess, Deschenes, Donaldson, and Greenstone (2011) estimate the relationship between weather extremes 
and infant mortality rates using the same infant mortality data used in this paper. 	 ﾠ 4 
pollution.
4  We also consider the primary water policy, the National River Conservation Plan, 
which  focused  on  reducing  industrial  pollution  in  the  rivers  and  creating  sewage  treatment 
facilities.  These regulations resemble environmental legislation in the United States and Europe, 
thereby providing an interesting study of the efficacy of similar regulations across very different 
institutional settings.     
The results are mixed: the air regulations have led to improvements in air pollution, while 
the water pollution regulations have been ineffective.  In the preferred econometric specification 
which controls for city fixed effects, year fixed effects and pre-existing trends among adopting 
cities, we find that the Supreme Court-mandated Action Plans are associated with declines in 
NO2  concentrations;  however,  we  do  not  observe  an  effect  of  the  policy  on  SO2  or  PM.  
Additionally, the requirement that new automobiles have catalytic converters is associated with 
economically large reductions in PM, SO2, and NO2 of 19 percent, 69 percent, and 15 percent, 
respectively, five years after its implementation.  In contrast, the National River Conservation 
Plan, which is the cornerstone of water policy in India, had no impact on the three measures of 
water quality we consider.  
In light of these findings, we tested whether the catalytic converter policy was associated 
with changes in measures of infant health.  The data indicate that a city’s adoption of a policy is 
associated with a decline in infant mortality, but this relationship is not statistically significant.  
As we discuss below, there are several reasons to interpret the infant mortality results cautiously.    
  In sum, our findings shed light on two broader questions.  First, the results suggest that 
environmental policies can be effective in developing countries, even in cases where income 
level  falls  within  the  range  where  the  environmental  Kuznets  curve  would  predict  that 
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4 We also documented the implementation of other key anti-pollution efforts.  However, these policies (such as the 
Problem  Area  Action  Plans,  and  the  multiple  sulfur  requirements  for  fuel)  had  insufficient  variation  in  their 
implementation across cities and/or time to obtain reliable estimates.  	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environmental  quality  should  be  decreasing.    Second,  the  results  suggest  that  bottom-up  
environmental  policies  are  more  likely  to  succeed  than  policies,  like  the  water  pollution 
regulations  that  are  initiated  by  political  institutions.  Thus,  while  the  results  suggest  that 
developing countries are able to effectively curb pollution, regulations imposed by international 
treaties,  like  those  contemplated  as  part  of  an  effort  to  confront  climate,  may  have  limited 
success without widespread political support from within.	 ﾠ
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides a brief history of environmental 
regulation in India and the policies under consideration, while Section III describes our data.  
Section IV describes the trends in pollution in India.  Section V describes our empirical methods, 
and  Section  VI  provides  our  results.  Section  VII  discusses  the  results,  and  Section  VIII 
concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
India has a relatively extensive set of regulations designed to improve both air and water quality.  
Its environmental policies have their roots in the Water Act of 1974 and Air Act of 1981. These 
acts created the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and the State Pollution Control Boards 
(SPCBs), which are responsible for data collection and policy enforcement, and also developed 
detailed procedures for environmental compliance.  Following the implementation of these acts, 
the  CPCB  and  SPCBs  quickly  advanced  a  national  environmental  monitoring  program 
(responsible for the rich data underlying our analysis).  The Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF), created in its initial form in 1980, was established largely to set the overall policies that 
the CPCB and SPCBs were to enforce (Hadden, 1987). 	 ﾠ 6 
The  Bhopal  Disaster  of  1984  represented  a  turning  point  in  the  course  of  Indian 
environmental  policy.    The  government’s  treatment  of  victims  of  the  Union  Carbide  plant 
explosion  “led  to  a  re-evaluation  of  the  environmental  protection  system,”  with  increased 
participation of activist groups, public interest lawyers, and the judiciary in the environmental 
space (Meagher 1990).  The Supreme Court instigated a wide expansion of fundamental rights of 
citizens and there was a steep rise in public interest litigation (Cha, 2005).  These developments 
led to some of India's first concrete environmental regulations, such as the closures of limestone 
quarries and tanneries in Uttar Pradesh in 1985 and 1987, respectively.
5 
  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, India continued to adopt a series of policies designed to 
counteract the effects of growing environmental damage.  The analysis focuses on two key air 
pollution policies, the Supreme Court Action Plans and the catalytic converter requirements, and 
the primary water pollution policies, the National River Conservation Plan.  These policies were 
at the forefront of India’s environmental efforts.  Importantly, these policies were also phased 
into different cities in different years, providing the basis for this paper’s research design.   
The first policy we focus on is the Supreme Court Action Plans. The Action Plans are 
part of a broad, ongoing effort to stem the tide of rising pollution in cities identified by the 
Supreme Court of India as critically polluted.  Measured pollution concentrations are clearly a 
key ingredient in the determination of these designations.  In 1996, Delhi was the first city order 
to develop an action plan, while the most recent action plans were mandated in 2003.
6  To date, 
17 cities have been given orders to develop action plans.  
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5 See Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Writ Petitions Nos. 8209 and 8821 of 
1983), and M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (WP 3727/1985).  
6  As documented in the court orders, the Supreme Court ordered nine more action plans in critically polluted cities 
“as per CPCB data” after Delhi.  A year later, the Court chose four more cities based on their having pollution levels 
at least as high as Delhi’s.  Finally, a year later, nine more cities (some repeats) were identified based on Respired 
SPM (smaller diameter) levels.   	 ﾠ 7 
In light of the Supreme Court’s reputation as a driver of environmental reform in India, as 
well as the overwhelming approval of Delhi’s CNG bus program as part of its action plan, many 
believe that these policies have made significant gains in improving air quality.  At least one 
round of plans was directed at cities with unacceptable levels of Respired Suspended Particulate 
Matter (RSPM), which is a subset of particulate matter (PM) that includes particles of especially 
small size.   Given the heavy focus on vehicular pollution, it is reasonable to presume that the 
plans affected NO2 levels.  Finally since SO2 is frequently a co-pollutant, it may be reasonable to 
expect the Action Plans to affects its ambient concentrations.  
  We then examine a policy that mandated the use of catalytic converters.  The fitment of 
catalytic converters is a common means of reducing vehicular pollution across the world, due to 
the low cost of its end-of-the-pipe technology.  In 1995, the Supreme Court required that all new 
petrol-fueled cars in the four major metros (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai) were to be fitted 
with converters.  In 1998, the policy was extended to 45 other cities.  It is plausible that this 
regulation could affect all three of our air quality indicators; however, the prediction is strongest 
for NO2.
7 
    Finally, we study the cornerstone of efforts to improve water quality, the National River 
Conservation Plan (NRCP).  Begun in 1985 under the name Ganga Action Plan (Phase I), the 
water pollution control program expanded first to tributaries of the Ganga River, including the 
Yamuna, Damodar, and Gomti in 1993.  It was later extended in 1995 to the other regulated 
rivers under the new name of NRCP. Today, 164 cities on 34 rivers are covered by the NRCP.  
The criteria for coverage by the NRCP are vague at best, but many documents on the plan cite 
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7 Public response to the catalytic converter policy was unfavorable for several reasons: petrol’s lower fuel share 
made the scope of the policy somewhat narrower than, for example, the mandate for low-sulfur in diesel fuel; 
unleaded  fuel,  which  is  known  to  be  a  prerequisite  for  smooth  catalytic  converter  functioning,  was  at  best 
inconsistently available until 2000; and selective implementation in only certain cities of India caused leakage of 
automobile purchases to other cities not covered by the policy.  	 ﾠ	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the CPCB Official Water Quality Criteria, which include standards for BOD, DO, FColi, and pH 
measurements  in  surface  water.    Much  of  the  focus  has  centered  around  domestic  pollution 
control initiatives over the years (Asian Development Bank, 2007).   
The centerpiece of the plan has been and continues to be the Sewage Treatment Plant 
(STP).  The interception, diversion, and treatment of sewage through piping infrastructure and 
treatment plant construction has been coupled with installation of community toilets, crematoria, 
and public awareness campaigns to curtail domestic pollution.  The NRCP has been panned in 
the media for a variety of reasons, including poor cooperation among participating agencies, 
imbalanced funding of sites, and inability to keep pace with the growth of sewage output in 
India’s cities (Suresh et al, 2007, p. 2).  If the policy is found to have had an effect, it may be 
expected to be particularly visible in FColi levels, since this is the parameter most correlated 
with domestic pollution in the data.  
 
III. DATA  
To conduct the analysis, we compiled the most comprehensive city-level panel data file ever 
assembled on air pollution concentrations, water pollution concentrations, and environmental 
policies in India.  We supplemented this data file with a city-level panel data file on infant 
mortality rates.  This section provides details on each data source. 
 
A. Air Pollution Data 
This paper takes advantage of an extensive and growing network of environmental monitoring 
stations across India.  Starting in 1987, India’s Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) began 
compiling readings of Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), and particulate matter with 	 ﾠ 9 
diameter less than 100 µm (PM). The data were collected as a part of the National Air Quality 
Monitoring Program (NAMP), a program established by the CPCB to help identify, assess, and 
prioritize the pollution controls needs in different areas, as well as to help in identifying and 
regulating potential hazards and pollution sources.
8  Individual State Pollution Control Boards 
(SPCBs) are responsible for collecting the pollution readings and sending the data to the CPCB 
for checking, compilation, and analysis.  The air quality data are from a combination of CPCB 
online and print materials for the years 1987-2007.
9   
While the CPCB reports that there are currently 342 functional air quality monitoring 
stations  in  127  Indian  cities,  there  has  been  much  movement  and  reclassification  of  these 
monitors over the years.  In total, our full dataset includes 572 monitors in 140 cities.  For some 
cities, data is collected in certain, but not all, years.
10  In 1987, the first year in our dataset, the 
functioning monitors cover 20 cities, while 125 cities are monitored by 2007 (see Appendix 
Table 1 for summary statistics of the data, by year).  On average, there are 2.3 monitors per city, 
with 78 percent of cities including data from more than one monitor in a given year.
11  Figure 2 
maps the location of the cities with air pollution data in at least one year.  
The three pollutants can be attributed to a variety of sources.  PM is regarded by the 
CPCB as a general indicator of pollution, receiving key contributions from “fossil fuel burning, 
industrial  processes  and  vehicular  exhaust.”  SO2  emissions,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
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8 For a more detailed description of the data collection program, see http://www.cpcb.nic.in/air.php (accessed on 
June 25, 2011). 
9 From the CPCB, we obtained monthly pollution readings per city from 1987-2004, and yearly pollution readings 
from 2005-2007.  The monthly data were averaged to get annual measures. 
10 The CPCB requires that 24 hour samplings be collected twice a week from each monitor for a total of 104 
observations per monitor per year.  As this goal is not always achieved, 16 or more successful hours of monitoring 
are considered representative of a given day’s air quality, and 50 days of monitoring in a year are viewed as 
sufficient for data analysis.  In some cities, readings are conducted more frequently.  For example, readings are 
conducted daily in Delhi.  This more frequent data is not included in our dataset.   
11 Each monitor is classified as belonging to one of three types of areas: residential (71 percent), industrial (26 
percent), or sensitive (2 percent).  The rationale for specific locations of monitors is, unfortunately, not known to us 
at this time so all monitors with sufficient readings are included in the analysis.  	 ﾠ 10 
predominantly a byproduct of thermal power generation; globally, 80 percent of sulfur emissions 
in 1990 were attributable to fossil fuel use (Smith, Pitcher and Wigley, 2001).  NO2 is viewed by 
the CPCB as an indicator of vehicular pollution, though it is produced in almost all combustion 
reactions. 
 
B. Water Pollution Data 
The CPCB also administers water quality monitoring, in cooperation with state pollution control 
boards (SPCBs).  As of 2008, 1,019 monitoring stations are maintained under the National Water 
Monitoring  Programme  (NWMP),  covering  rivers  and  creeks,  lakes  and  ponds,  drains  and 
canals, and groundwater sources. We focus on rivers due to the consistent availability of data on 
river quality, the seriousness of pollution problems along the rivers, and, most significantly, the 
attention that rivers have received from public policy. We have obtained from the CPCB, in 
electronic format, observations from 489 monitors in 424 cities along 162 rivers between the 
years 1986 and 2005 (see Appendix Table 1).
12  Figure 3 maps the location of the water quality 
monitors on India’s major rivers.  
The  CPCB  collects  either  monthly  or  quarterly  river  data  on  28  measures  of  water 
quality, of which nine are classified as “core parameters.”  We focus on three of these core 
parameters: Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Dissolved Oxygen (DO), and Fecal Coliforms 
(FColi). We chose these measurements largely because of their presence in CPCB Official Water 
Quality Criteria, and also their continual citation in planning, analysis, and commentary, as well 
as the consistency of their reporting.
13   
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12	 ﾠFrom 1986 to 2004, monthly data is available.  For 2005, the data is only available yearly.	 ﾠ
13 See Water Quality: Criteria and Goals (February 2002); Status of Water Quality in India (April 2006); and the 
official CPCB website, http://www.cpcb.nic.in/Water_Quality_Criteria.php. 	 ﾠ	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These indicators can be briefly summarized as follows.  BOD is a commonly-used broad 
indicator of water quality that measures the quantity of oxygen required by the decomposition of 
organic waste in water.  High values are indicative of heavy pollution; however, since water-
borne pollutants can be inorganic as well, BOD cannot be considered a comprehensive measure 
of water purity. DO is similar to BOD except that it is inversely proportional to pollution; that is, 
lower quantities of dissolved oxygen in water suggest greater pollution because water-borne 
waste hinders mixing of water with the surrounding air, as well as hampering oxygen production 
from aquatic plant photosynthesis.  The third water parameter, FColi, is a count of the number of 
coliform bacteria per 100 milliliters (ml) of water. While not directly harmful, these organisms 
are associated with animal and human waste and are correlated with the presence of harmful 
pathogens.  FColi is thus considered to be an indicator of domestic pollution.  It is measured as 
the most probable number of fecal coliform bacteria per 100 milliliters (ml) of water.  Since its 
distribution is approximately ln normal, FColi is reported as ln(number of bacteria per 100 ml) 
throughout the paper.  
 
C. Regulation Data 
India has implemented a variety of environmental initiatives over the last two decades. We have 
assembled a dataset that systematically documents changes in policy at the city-year level for the 
cities in the air and water pollution datasets.  To the best of our knowledge, we believe that a 
comparable data set has never been compiled.  
The data were compiled from a variety of sources. We first collected and utilized print 
and web documents from the Indian government, including the CPCB, the Department of Road 
Transport and Highways, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, and several Indian SPCBs. 	 ﾠ 12 
Next, we used reports and data from secondary sources, including the World Bank, the Emission 
Controls Manufacturers Association, and Urbanrail.net.   
Table 1 summarizes the prevalence of these policies in the data file of city-level air and 
water pollution concentrations by year.  Columns (1a) and (2a) report the number of cities with 
air and water readings, respectively.  The remaining columns detail the number of these cities 
where each of the studied policies is in force.  The subsequent analysis exploits the variation in 
the year of enactment of these policies across cities.
14  
 
D. Infant Mortality Rate Data 
We obtained annual city-level infant mortality data from annual issues of Vital Statistics of India 
for the years prior to 1996.
15  In subsequent years, city level data are no longer available from a 
central source; therefore, we visited the registrar’s office for each of India’s larger states and 
collected the necessary documents directly.
16  Many births and deaths are not registered in India 
and the available evidence suggests that this problem is greater for deaths so the infant mortality 
rate is likely downward biased.  Although the infant mortality rate from the Vital Statistics data 
is about a third of the rate measured from state-level survey measures of infant mortality rates 
(i.e., the Sample Registration System), trends in the Vital Statistics and survey data are highly 
correlated.  Although these data are likely to be noisy, we are unaware of reasons to believe that 
the measurement error is correlated with the pollution measures.  Notably, Burgess et al. (2011) 
find that they are correlated with inter-annual temperature variation.    
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14 Appendix Table 2 replicates Table 1 for all cities in India. 
15 We digitized the city-level data from the books.  All data were double entered and checked for consistency. 
16  Specifically,  we  attempted  to  obtain  data  in  all  states  except  the  Northeastern  states  (which  have  travel 
restrictions) and Jammu-Kashmir.  We were able to obtain data from Andhra Pradesh, Chandigarh, Delhi, Goa, 
Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, and West Bengal. 	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E. Additional Variables 
We collected city-level, socio-economic variables that are used as controls in the subsequent 
analysis.
17  First, we obtained district-level data on population and literacy rates from the 1981, 
1991, and 2001 Census of India. For non-census years, we linearly interpolated these variables.  
Second, we collected district-level expenditure per capita data, which is a proxy for income. The 
data are imputed from the survey of household consumer expenditure carried out by India's 
National Sample Survey Organization in the years 1987, 1993, and 1999 and are imputed in the 
missing years.   
 
IV. TRENDS IN POLLUTION CONCENTRATIONS AND INFANT HEALTH 
A.  Trends in Mean Pollution Levels over Time 
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the trends in national air and water quality.  Panel 
A plots the average air quality measured across cities, by pollutant, from 1987 to 2007; Panel B 
graphs water quality measured across city-rivers, by pollutant, from 1986 to 2005.  Table 2 
provides corresponding sample statistics.  Specifically, it provides the average pollution levels 
for the full sample, as well as values at the start and end of the sample timeframe. 
Air pollution has fallen. As shown in Panel A, ambient PM concentrations fell quite 
steadily over the sample timeframe, from 252.1 µg/m
3 in 1987-1990 to 209.5 µg/m
3 in 2004-
2007.  This represents about a 17 percent reduction in PM.  The SO2 trend line is flat until the 
late 1990s, and then declines sharply. Comparing the 1987-1990 to 2004-2007 time periods, 
mean  SO2  decreased  from  19.4  to  12.2  µg/m
3  (or  37  percent).    Finally,  NO2  appears  more 
volatile over the start of the sample period, but then falls after its peak in 1997.   
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17 Consistent city-level data in India is notoriously difficult to obtain.  We instead acquired district level data, and 
matched cities to their respective districts.  	 ﾠ	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  While air quality has generally improved over the past twenty years, the trends in water 
quality are more mixed.  As seen in Panel B of Figure 4, BOD steadily worsens throughout the 
late 1980s and early 1990s but then begins to improve starting around 1997.  The improvement, 
though, did not make up for early losses, as mean BOD worsens by about 19 percent from 3.47 
to 4.14 mg/l over the sample period.  FColi drops precipitously in the 1990s but rises somewhat 
in the 2000s.   The general decrease in FColi is notable, as it suggests that domestic water 
pollution may be abating, in spite of the alarmingly fast-paced growth in sewage generation seen 
in India (Suresh et al, 2007).  Over the sample period, the natural log of the number of fecal 
coliform bacteria per 100 ml declined from 6.41 to 5.28.  DO declines fairly steadily over time (a 
fall in DO indicates worsening water quality) from 7.21 to 7.03 mg/l.   
 
B.  Trends in Infant Health 
Infant mortality rates are an appealing measure of the effectiveness of environmental regulations, 
relative to measures of adult health.  This is because it seems reasonable to presume that infant 
health will be more responsive to short and medium changes in pollution and the first year of life 
is an especially vulnerable one so losses of life expectancy may be large.  Since 1987, infant 
mortality has fallen sharply in urban India (Panel C of Figure 4).  As Panel C of Table 2 shows, 
the infant mortality rate fell from 29.6 per 1000 live births in 1987-1990 to 16.7 in 2001-2004.  	 ﾠ
 
C.  A More Disaggregated Analysis 
Is there spatial variation in these trends?  To explore this, we next graph the distributions of air 
and water quality across cities at the start and end of the sample period.  Specifically, we provide 
kernel density estimates of air pollutant distributions across Indian cities for 1987-1990 and 	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2004-2007 in Figure 5A, and similar estimates of water pollutant distributions for 1986-1989 and 
2002-2005 in Figure 5B.  We then construct similar graphs for infant mortality in Figure 5C. 
Figure 5A shows that not only have the means of PM and SO2 decreased, but their entire 
distributions have shifted to the left over the last two decades.  The 10
th percentiles of PM and 
SO2 pollution both declined by about 10 percent from 1987-1990 to 2004-2007.  Particularly 
striking, however, is the drop in the 90
th percentile of ambient SO2 concentration: 38.2 to 23.0 
µg/m
3, or about 40 percent. Consistent with trends in Figure 2, the distribution of NO2 across 
cities does not appear to change much over the sample time frame. In fact, if anything, the 
distribution of pollution appears to have worsened, with the 10
th percentile rising from 8.5 to 
10.4 µg/m
3 and the 90
th percentile rising from 42.6 to 47.0 µg/m
3. 
The changes in the distribution of water quality are more variable over time (Figure 5B). 
The distribution of BOD has widened over the last twenty years, with many relatively higher 
readings of BOD in the later time period.
18  While the 10
th percentile of BOD has dropped 
slightly, the 90
th percentile has increased from 5.78 to 7.85 mg/l between the earlier and more 
recent periods.  In contrast, the FColi distribution has largely shifted to the left. The relatively 
clean cities show tremendous drops in FColi levels, with the 10
th percentile value falling from 
3.61 to 1.79, while dirtier cities show more modest declines. Lastly, the DO distribution does not 
appear to have changed noticeably, with very little difference between the graphs of the earlier 
and later periods. 
Figure  5C  reveals  a  marked  improvement  in  infant  mortality  rates  over  this  period.  
Indeed, the kernel density graphs reveal a leftward shift in the distribution of infant mortality 
rates. 
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18 The right tail of the 2002-2005 period extends to 100 mg/l.  In the figure, it has been truncated at 20 to give a 
more detailed picture of the distribution.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16 
   
V. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
This  section  describes  a  two-stage  econometric  approach  for  assessing  whether  India’s 
regulatory policies impacted air and water pollution concentrations.  The first-stage is an event 
study-style equation: 
1  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ     =   +     ,   +    +    + β    +    
 
 
where Yct is one of the six measures of pollution in city c in year t.  The city fixed effects,    ﾠ, 
control for all permanent unobserved determinants of pollution across cities, while the inclusion 
of the year fixed effects, µt, non-parametrically adjust for national trends in pollution, which is 
important in light of the time patterns observed in Figure 2.  The equation also includes controls 
for per capita consumption and literacy rates (X) in order to adjust for differential rates of growth 
across districts.  To account for differences in precision due to city size, the estimating equation 
is weighted by the district-urban population.
19 
  The vector Dτ,ct is composed of a separate indicator variable for each of the years before 
and after a policy is in force.  τ is normalized so that it is equal to zero in the year the relevant 
policy is enacted; it ranges from -17 (for 17 years before a policy's adoption in a city) through 12 
(for 12 years after its adoption).  All τ's are set equal to zero for non-adopting cities; these 
observations  aid  in  the  identification  of  the  year  effects  and  the  β's.    In  the  air  pollution 
regressions, there are separate Dτ,ct vectors for the Supreme Court Action Plan and catalytic 
converter policies, so each policy's impact is conditioned on the other policy's impact.
20   
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19 City-level population figures are not systematically available, so we use population in the urban part of the district 
in which the city is located to proxy for city-level population.   
20 The results are qualitatively similar in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance from models that evaluate each 
policy separately.   	 ﾠ	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  The sample for equation (1) is based on the availability of data for a particular pollutant 
in a city.  For adopting cities, a city is included in the sample if it has at least one observation 
three years or more before the policy's enactment and four or more years afterward.  If a city 
does not have any post-adoption observations or did not enact the relevant policy, then that city 
is required to have at least two observations for inclusion in the sample.   
  The  parameters  of  interest  are  the  στ's,  which  measure  the  average  annual  pollution 
concentration  in  the  years  before  and  after  a  policy's  implementation.  These  estimates  are 
purged of any permanent differences in pollution concentrations across cities and of national 
trends due to the inclusion of the city and year fixed effects.  The variation in the timing of the 
adoption of the individual policies across cities allows for the separate identification of the στ's 
and the year fixed effects.   
  In the below, the estimated στ's are plotted against the τ's.  These event study graphs 
provide an opportunity to visually assess whether the policies are associated with changes in 
pollution  concentrations.    Additionally,  they  allow  for  an  examination  of  whether  pollution 
concentrations  in  adopting  cities  were  on  differential  trends.    These  figures  will  inform  the 
choice of the preferred second-stage model. 
  The second-stage of the econometric approach formally tests whether the policies are 
associated with pollution reductions with three different specifications.  In the first, we fit the 
following equation: 
2a  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ   =    +   1(      )  +    
where 1(      )  is an indicator variable for whether the policy is in force (i.e., τ ≥ 1).  Thus, π1 
tests for a mean shift in pollution concentrations after the policy's implementation.   	 ﾠ 18 
  In several cases, the event study figures reveal trends in pollution concentrations that 
predate the policy's implementation (even after adjustment for the city and year fixed effects).  
Therefore, we also fit the following equation: 
2b  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ   =    +   1(      )  +   τ+  .	 ﾠ
This  specification  includes  a  control  for  a  linear  time  trend  in  event  time,  τ,  to  adjust  for 
differential pre-existing trends in adopting cities.  
Equations (2a) and (2b) test for a mean shift in pollution concentrations after the policy's 
implementation.  A mean shift may be appropriate for some of the policies that we evaluate.  On 
the other hand, the full impact of some of the policies may emerge over time as the government 
builds the necessary institutions to enforce a policy and as firms and individuals begin to take the 
steps necessary to comply with them.  For example, an evolving policy impact seems possible 
for the Supreme Court Action Plans since they specify actions that polluters must take over 
several years.   
To allow for a policy's impact to evolve over time, we also report the results from fitting: 
2c  ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ   =    +   1(      )  +   τ +   (1(      ) ×τ) +   . 
From this specification, we report the impact of a policy 5 years after it has been in force as 
   + 5  .   
  There are three remaining estimation issues about equations (2a) through (2c) that bear 
noting.  First, the sample is chosen so that there is sufficient precision to compare the pre- and 
post-adoption periods.  Specifically, for two of the policies it is restricted to values of τ for which 
there are at least twenty city by year observations to identify the στ's.  For the catalytic converter 
regressions,  the  sample  therefore  covers  τ  =  -7  through  τ  =  9  and  for  the  National  River 
Conservation Plan regressions it includes τ = -7 through τ = 10 (see Appendix Table 3).  In the 	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case of the Supreme Court action plan policies which were implemented more narrowly, the 
sample is restricted to values of τ for which there are a minimum of 15 and this leads to a sample 
that includes τ = -7 through τ = 3.   Second, the standard errors for these second stage equations 
are heteroskedastic consistent.  Third, the equation is weighted by the inverse of the standard 
error associated with the relevant στ to account for differences in precision in the estimation of 
these parameters.   
   
VI. RESULTS 
A. Air Pollution 
Figure 6 presents the event study graphs of the impact of the policies on PM (Panel A), SO2 
(Panel B), and NO2 (Panel C).  Each graph plots the estimated στ's from equation (1).  The year 
of  the  policy's  adoption,  τ  =  0,  is  demarcated  by  a  vertical  dashed  line  in  all  figures.  
Additionally, pollution concentrations are normalized so that they are equal to zero in τ = -1, and 
this is noted with the dashed horizontal line.   
These figures are "hands above the table" summaries of the data in the sense that they 
visually report all the data that underlie the subsequent regressions.  It is evident that accounting 
for differential trends in adopting cities is crucial, because the parallel trends assumption of the 
simple difference in differences or means shift model (i.e., equation (2a)) is violated in many 
cases.    This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  the  catalytic  converter  policies  which  were 
implemented in cities where pollution concentrations were worsening.  This upward pre-trend in 
pollution concentrations is also apparent in the case of the Supreme Court Action Plans (SCAPs) 
and NO2.  In these instances, equations (2b) and (2c) are more likely to produce valid estimates 
of the policies’ impacts.  With respect to inferring the impact of the policies, the figures suggest 	 ﾠ 20 
that the catalytic converter policy was effective at reversing the trend toward increasing pollution 
concentrations.    
  To test these results more formally, Table 3 reports regression results from the estimation 
of separate equations for each pollutant and policy pair.  For each pollutant-policy pair, the first 
column reports the estimate of π1 from equation (2a), which tests whether στ is on average lower 
after the implementation of the policy.  The second column reports the estimate of π1 and π2 from 
the fitting of equation (2b) in the second column for each pollutant.  Here, π1 tests for a policy 
impact after adjustment for the trend in pollution levels (π2).  The third column reports the results 
from equation (2c) that allows for a mean shift and trend break after the policy’s implementation.  
It also reports the estimated effect of the policy five years after implementation for the policies, 
which is equal to    + 5  .   
Reading across Panel A, it is evident that the SCAPs have a mixed record of success.
21  
There is little evidence of an impact on PM or SO2 concentrations.  The available evidence for an 
impact comes from the NO2 regressions that control for pre-existing trends.  In column (8) the 
estimated impact would not be judged statistically significant, while in column (9) it is of a large 
magnitude and would be judged marginally significant. 
In  contrast,  the  regressions  confirm  the  visual  impression  that  the  catalytic  converter 
policies were strongly associated with air pollution reductions.  In light of the differential pre-
trends in pollution in adopting cities and that the policy's impact will only emerge as the stock of 
cars  changes,  the  richest  specification  (equation  (2c))  is  likely  to  be  the  most  reliable.    It 
indicates that 5 years after the policy was in force, PM, SO2, and NO2 declined by 48.6 µg/m
3, 
13.4 µg/m
3, and 4.5 µg/m
3, respectively.  The PM and SO2 declines are statistically significant 
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21 Note that for the Supreme Court Action Plans, the analysis lags the policies by one year.  The dates we have 
correspond to Court Orders, which mandated submission of Action Plans.  However, the Plans were frequently 
reviewed by a special committee and only afterwards declared/implemented.  	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when judged by conventional criteria, while the NO2 decline is not.  These declines are 19 
percent,  69  percent,  and  15  percent  of  the  1987-1990  nationwide  mean  concentrations, 
respectively.  These  percentage  declines  are  large  and  this  reflects  the  rapid  rates  at  which 
ambient  pollution  concentrations  were  increasing  before  the  implementation  of  the  catalytic 
converter  policy  in  adopting  cities--  put  another  way,  if  the  pre-trends  had  continued  then 
pollution concentrations would have reached levels much higher than those recorded in the 1987-
1990 period.
22 
 
B. Effects of Policies on Water Quality 
Figure 7 presents event study analyses of the impact of the National River Conservation Plan 
(NRCP) on BOD (Panel A), ln(FColi) (Panel B), and DO (Panel C).  As in Figure 6, the figures 
plot the results from the estimation of equation (1).  From the figures, there is little evidence that 
the NRCP was effective at reducing pollution concentrations.    
  Table  4  provides  the  corresponding  regression  analysis  and  is  structured  similarly  to 
Table 3.  The evidence in favor of a policy impact is weak.  BOD concentrations are lower after 
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22 There is a tradeoff to in including a greater or smaller number of event years or taus in the second-stage analysis.  
The inclusion of a wider range of taus provides a larger sample size, allows for more precise estimation of pre and 
post  adoption  trends.    But,  at  the  same  time,  it  moves  further  away  from  the  event  in  question  so  that  other 
unobserved  factors  may  confound  the  estimation  of  the  policy  effects.    Further,  it  exacerbates  the  problems 
associated with estimating the taus from an unbalanced panel data file of cities.  In contrast, including fewer taus 
would result in a smaller sample size (and number of cities) to estimate pre and post trends, but it the analysis would 
be more narrowly focused around the policy event.  Appendix Table 3 reports on the number of city by year 
observations that identify the στ's associated with each event year.    
 
We investigated the sensitivity  of the  results to the number of taus  included in the  analysis.  Specifically, we 
estimated models that include a wider range of taus (between [-14,4] for the SCAPs and [-9,9] for the Catalytic 
Converters), as well as models that limit the taus to a narrower range (between [-4,4] for the SCAPs and [-5,5] for 
the Catalytic Converters),  The application of these alternative samples to the preferred specification, equation (2c), 
produces results that are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 3 and 4.   The SCAP is associated with a large and 
significant decline in NO2 with the narrower range.  With the wider range, the SCAP continues to be associated with 
a decline in NO2 but it no longer would be judged to be statistically significant; however, it is associated with a 
statistically significant decline in PM.  The pattern of the coefficients for the Catalytic Converters policy is similar to 
that of Table 3, regardless of increasing or decreasing the range of taus. 
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the implementation of NRCP, but the decline occurs several years prior to the implementation of 
the  plan  (Panel  A).    While  NRCP  targets  domestic  pollution,  the  data  fail  to  reveal  an 
improvement in FColi concentrations (Panel B), which is the best measure of domestic sourced 
water pollution.  The results from the fitting of equation (2c) are reported in column (9) and 
confirm the perverse visual impression that the NRCP is associated with a worsening in DO 
concentrations (recall, lower DO levels indicate higher pollution concentrations).
23 
The finding that the NRCP has not been successful is not surprising in light of some 
supplementary research into process outcomes.  For example, as of March, 2009, 152 out of 165 
towns officially covered under NRCP have been approved for Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) 
capacity building, but only 82 of those towns have actually built any capacity.  Additionally, as 
of March, 2009, there has not been any spending of federal or state monies on the NRCP in 
fifteen NRCP towns (National River Conservation Directorate, 2009).   Furthermore, the Centre 
for Science and Environment (CSE) in New Delhi calculates that the 2006 treatment capacity 
was only 18.5 percent of the full sewage burden (Suresh et al, 2007, p. 11). 
 
C.  Effects of Catalytic Converters on Infant Mortality 
The catalytic converter policy is the most strongly related to improvements in air pollution.  This 
subsection explores whether this policy is associated with improvements in human health, as 
measured by infant mortality rates.  Specifically, we fit equation (1) and equations (2a) - (2c), 
where the infant mortality rate, rather than pollution concentration, is the outcome of interest.   
  We note several aspects of this estimation.  First, despite a large data collection exercise 
to obtain the infant mortality data (including going to each state capital to obtain additional 
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23 This finding that the NRCP had little impact on the available measures of water pollution is unchanged by 
increasing or decreasing the number of event years or taus (i.e., changing the event years to include [-9,12] or to 
include [-5,5]) in the second-stage analysis.   	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registry  data),  there  are  fewer  cities  in  the  sample.
24  Second,  the  dependent  variable  is 
constructed as the ratio of infant deaths to births, so we weight equation (1) by the number of 
births in the city that year.  Third, it is natural to be interested in using the catalytic converter 
induced variation to estimate the separate impacts of each of the three forms of air pollution on 
infant mortality in a two-stage least squares setting.  However, such an approach is invalid in this 
setting because, even in the best case where the exclusion restriction is valid, there is a single 
instrument for three endogenous variables.  Fourth, the infant mortality rate data do not provide 
any characteristics of the parents or other covariates, so it is not possible to determine the degree 
to which the results are due to shifts in the composition of parents that alter the observed infant 
population's  health  endowment.    This  issue  is  a  greater  challenge  in  light  of  the  possibly 
substantial underreporting of infant births and deaths in these data.    
  Figure 8 and Table 5 report the results.  In light of the differential pre-existing trend, the 
column (3) specification is likely to be the most reliable.  It suggests that the catalytic converter 
policy is associated with a reduction in the infant mortality rate of 0.86 per 1,000 live births.  
However, this estimate is imprecise and is not statistically significant. 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
This  paper's  analysis  is  related  to  at  least  two  key  economics  questions.    First,  is  there  a 
deterministic relationship between income and environmental quality?  Second, why are some 
environmental policies so much more effective than others?  The paper's results shed new light 
on these questions. 
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24When the air pollution sample is restricted to the sample used to estimate the infant mortality equations, the 
catalytic converter policy is associated with substantial reductions in PM and SO2 concentrations but not of NO2 
concentrations. 	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A. Contradicting Predictions from the Environmental Kuznets Curve Literature 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) predicts greater environmental degradation as income 
rises for countries at low incomes levels (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Bandypadhyay, 1992).  
When income levels rise beyond a high enough point, individuals will no longer be willing to 
trade off environment quality for economic growth and resources will be available to invest in 
enforcing environmental regulation.  At this point, economic growth will be correlated with 
environmental improvements.   
  The  range  for  the  turning  point  varies  considerably  across  empirical  studies.    For 
example, Grossman and Kruger (1995) estimate the turning point for SO2 at around $4,000, with 
the  turning  point  for  most  pollutants  around  or  below  $8,000.    Similarly,  Shafik  and 
Bandyopadhyay’s  (1992)  study  (which  was  used  in  the  1992  World  Development  Report) 
estimated turning points of about $3,000 to $4,000 for local air pollutant concentrations.  Using 
an updated data set, but following Grossman and Kruger’s econometric specification, Harbaugh, 
Levinson, and Wilson (2002) find higher turning points (e.g., for SO2 the turning points range 
from  $13,000  to  $20,000),  but  the  results  are  not  robust  to  changes  in  the  specification.  
Similarly, they find high and varying turning points for PM, ranging from $2,000 to $13,000, 
depending on the specification. 
  Two of this paper's results contradict the EKC model.  First, India’s per capita GDP was 
$374 in 1990 when environment regulations became salient there and this is substantially below 
the estimated turning point.
25  However, this paper demonstrates that that the catalytic converter 
mandate was associated with substantial improvements in air quality.   
  Second, the EKC model predicts similar trends for local pollutants.  However, there are 
substantial differences in trends across the various types of air and water pollution.  Moreover, 
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25 India’s GDP was obtained from the World Development Indicators. 	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the analysis documents that the air pollution policies were effective, while the water pollution 
regulations were largely ineffective.  These differences in regulatory effectiveness across media 
are not predicted by the EKC model. 
   
B. Political Power Matters 
The  EKC  model  fails  to  capture  some  of  the  dominant  themes  in  the  data.    This 
subsection explores some political economy explanations for the differences in the success of the 
air and water regulations.   
  The  legitimacy  to  enforce  policies  appears  to  be  a  strong  predictor  of  success.    In 
particular, the Supreme Court enjoys substantial power within the Indian government and there is 
an established history of the Court providing an effective and visible outlet for public activism.  
Indeed, the SCAPs, and somewhat more indirectly the catalytic converter policies, resulted from 
citizen suits filed in response to high levels of air pollution.
26  At least in the case of the catalytic 
converter  policy,  there  is  substantial  qualitative  evidence  that  these  policies  were  enforced 
stringently by tying vehicle registrations to installation of a catalytic converter.
27  With this 
context, it may not be surprising that these two sets of policies were generally successful in 
reducing air pollution concentrations.  
In contrast, the central government agencies, such as the CPCB/SPCBs and the Ministry 
of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), have a less clear mandate for action and less successful 
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26 Court Order on April 5
th, 2002, Supreme Court of India. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985. M.C. Mehta vs. 
Union of India and Others. 
27 Narain and Bell (2005) write, “In 1995 the Delhi government announced that it would subsidize the installation of 
catalytic converters in all two- and three-wheel vehicles to the extent of 1,000 Rs. within the next three years (Indian 
Express, January 30, 1995). Furthermore, the Petroleum Ministry banned the registration of new four-wheel cars and 
vehicles without catalytic converters in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, and Calcutta effective April 1, 1995 (Telegraph, 
March 13, 1995). This directive was implemented, although it is alleged that some vehicle owners had the 
converters removed illegally (court order, February 14, 1996).”  Further, Delhi currently has about 20 vehicle 
registration outposts.   	 ﾠ 26 
track records of reform across a variety of domains.  The NRCP was originally developed and 
launched by the MoEF and overseen by a newly-created authority chaired by the Prime Minister 
of India. The job of implementation and enforcement was delegated to CPCB/SPCBs and local 
departments for public health, development, water, and sewage (Ministry of Environment and 
Forests, 2006).  The already difficult task of enforcing the NRCP was further complicated by the 
fact that the legislation is vague on the question of where the jurisdiction to enforce the policies 
lies.
28  For example, a former CPCB chairman summed up the problem quite clearly: “When it 
comes to doing things, it is not up to the CPCB, even in the area of air pollution.” (Sharma and 
Roychowdhury, 1996, p. 128)     
Further, an absence of a clear source of revenues for NRCP activities is likely to have 
contributed to the program’s poor record of performance.  The sewage plants that are frequently 
mandated by the NRCP had mandated cost sharing at various points in time.
29  State and local 
bodies have been accused of financial mismanagement, including diversion, underutilization, and 
incorrect  reporting  of  funds  (Ministry  of  Environment  and  Forests,  2006).  Overall,  the 
implementation of the NRCP through agencies that have traditionally not been very powerful, 
the  jurisdictional  opacity  around  implementation,  and  a  failure  to  provide  a  clear  source  of 
revenues to fund clean-up activities mean that the NRCP was never politically empowered to 
succeed.
30      
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28 For example, the Public Accounts Committee Report to Parliament cited in this section (MoEF, 2006) only 
mentions the word “enforcement” once in over 100 pages. 
29 From the inception of GAP-Phase I in 1985, the central government was to be responsible for 100 percent of 
policy funding. In 1990, it was decided that the cost would be split between central and state administrations. This 
division was revoked in 1997, returning the full cost to the Union government. One final change was made in 2001, 
allocating 30 percent of the financial burden to states, a third of which was levied on local bodies themselves 
(Suresh et al, 2007, p. 3). 
30 For example, a MoEF (2006) report stated that: “The reasons for delay in the implementation of the Ganga Action 
Plan Phase-I are: (i) Lack of experience with the State implementing agencies, delay in land acquisition, litigations 
and court cases, contractual disputes and diversion of funds by the State Governments. (ii) Poor operation and 	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VI. Conclusion 
Using  the  most  comprehensive  data  file  ever  compiled  on  air  pollution,  water  pollution, 
environmental regulations, and infant mortality for a developing country, this paper measures the 
success  of  air  and  water  pollution  regulations  in  India.      The  paper  finds  that  air  pollution 
regulations were very effective at reducing ambient concentrations of particulate matter, sulfur 
dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide and a key determinant of the observed improvements in air quality 
over the last two decades.  In contrast, the results indicate that the National River Conservation 
Plan—the cornerstone of India’s water policies—failed to lead to meaningful improvements in 
any of the three separate measures of water pollution that we consider.   
There  are  several  broader  meanings  of  these  results.    First,  the  difference  in  the 
effectiveness of the air and water pollution regulations make it clear that the world is more 
complicated and nuanced that is suggested by simple theories, like the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve theory.  There is substantial room for more modeling in this area.   
Second,  the  findings  demonstrate  that  environment  regulations  can  be  enforced 
successfully  in  countries  with  relatively  low  levels  of  income  and  weak  institutions,  which 
contradicts widely held perceptions.  However, it leaves unanswered the fundamental questions 
of the magnitudes of the marginal benefits and costs of regulation-induced emissions reductions 
and whether the benefits exceed the costs.  There is a virtual complete absence of information on 
the costs and benefits. 
Third,  the  political  economy  findings  may  have  implications  for  the  development  of 
successful  climate  change  policy,  which  will  require  participation  by  developing  countries, 
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maintenance of the assets created under the 'Ganga Action Plan' Phase–I.  (iii)  Erratic  and  poor  availability  of 
electricity for operating assets like pumping stations, sewage treatment plants and electric crematoria.” (p. 3) 	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including  India  and  China.  Specifically,  they  suggest  that  international  efforts  to  reduce 
greenhouse gases in developing countries will have limited success if they do not enjoy local 
support.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Asian Development Bank. “Yamuna Action Plan – India,” in Asian Water Development Outlook 
2007.  Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2007. 
 
Burgess, Robin, Olivier Deschenes, Dave Donaldson, and Michael Greenstone.  2011. “Weather 
and Death in India: Mechanisms and Implications for Climate Change.”  Mimeo. 
 
Cha, J. Mijin. 2005.  “A Critical Examination of the Environmental Jurisprudence of the Courts 
of India,” Albany Law Environmental Outlook Journal, 10: 197. 
 
Chay, Kenneth and Michael Greenstone.  2003.  “Air Quality, Infant Mortality, and the Clean 
Air Act of 1970,” Mimeo. 
 
Chay, Kenneth and Michael Greenstone.  2005.  “Does Air Quality Matter?  Evidence from the 
Housing Market,” Journal of Political Economy, 113(2). 
 
Chen, Yuyu,, Avraham Ebenstein, Michael Greenstone, and Hongbin Li.  2011. “The Long-Run 
Impact of Air Pollution on Life Expectancy: Evidence from China’s Huai River Policy,” Mimeo. 
 
Copeland, Brian and M. Scott Taylor.  2004.  Journal of Economic Literature, 42: 7-71. 
 
Davis, Lucas W. 2008. "The Effect of Driving Restrictions on Air Quality in Mexico City." 
Journal of Political Economy, 116(1): 38-81. 
 
Foster, Andrew D., and Naresh Kumar. 2008.  “Have CNG regulations in Delhi done their job?” 
Economic and Political Weekly, 42(51): 48-58. 
 
Foster, Andrew D., and Naresh Kumar. 2009. “Air Quality Interventions and Spatial Dynamics 
of  Air  Pollution  in  Delhi  and  its  Surroundings.”  International  Journal  of  Environment  and 
Waste, 4(1/2): 85-111. 
 
Greenstone, Michael.  2003.  “Estimating Regulation-Induced Substitution: The Effect of the 
Clean  Air  Act  on  Water  and  Ground  Pollution.”  American  Economic  Review  Papers  and 
Proceedings, 93(2): 442-448. 
 	 ﾠ 29 
Greenstone,  Michael.    2004.    “Did  the  Clean  Air  Act  Amendments  Cause  the  Remarkable 
Decline  in  Sulfur  Dioxide  Concentrations?”  Journal  of  Environmental  Economics  and 
Management, 47. 
 
Grossman, Gene M., and Alan B. Krueger. 1995. “Economic Growth and the Environment.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2): 353–77.  
 
Hadden, Susan G. 1987.  “Statutes and Standards for Pollution Control in India,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 22 (16): 709-711+713-720. 
 
Hanna,  Rema,  and  Paulina  Oliva.  2010.  "The  Impact  of  Inspections  on  Plant-Level  Air 
Emissions." The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 10(1). 
 
Hanna, Rema, and Paulina Oliva.  2011.  “The Effect of Pollution on Labor Supply:  Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment in Mexico City,” Mimeo. 
 
Harbaugh,  William,  Arik  Levinson  and  David  Wilson.    2002.    "Reexamining  the  Empirical 
Evidence  for  an  Environmental  Kuznets  Curve."  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics,  84(3):  
541-551. 
 
Henderson, J. Vernon. 1996. "Effects of Air Quality Regulation." American Economic Review, 
86: 789-813. 
 
Meagher, J. Patrick.  1990.  “Environmental Protection and Industries in Developing Countries:  
The Case of India Since Bhopal.” The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 
3(1):  1-53. 
 
Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2006. “26th Report of the Public Accounts Committee 
(Fourteenth Lok Sabha): Ganga Action Plan.” Presented to Lok Sabha on March 17th, 2006. Lok 
Sabha Secretariat: New Delhi. 
 
Narain, Urvashi and Ruth Greenspan Bell.  2005.  “Who Changed Delhi’s Air?  The Roles of the 
Court and the Executive in Environmental Policymaking.”  Resources for the Future Discussion 
Paper.   
 
National River Conservation Directorate. “M.I.S. Report of Programmes Under National River 
Conservation Plan, Vol. III.” National River Conservation Directorate, Ministry of Environment 
and Forests, Government of India: New Delhi, March, 2009. 
 
Selden,  Thomas  M.,  and  Daqing  Song.  1994.  “Environmental  Quality  and  Development:  Is 
There  a  Kuznets  Curve  for  Air  Pollution?”  Journal  of  Environmental  Economics  and 
Environmental Management, 27(2): 147-162. 
 
Shafik,  Nemat  and  Sushenjit  Bandyopadhyay.  1992.  “Economic  Growth  and  Environmental 
Quality: Time Series and Cross-Country Evidence.”  The World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper Series 904. 	 ﾠ 30 
 
Sharma,  Anju  and  Anumita  Roychowdhury.  Slow  Murder:  The  deadly  story  of  vehicular 
pollution in India. New Delhi : Centre for Science and Environment, 1996. 
 
Smith, Steven J, Hugh Pitcher and T.M.L Wigley.  2001.  “Global and regional anthropogenic 
sulfur dioxide emissions” Global and Planetary Change, 29 (1-2): 99–119. 
 
Stern,  David  and  Michael  Common.    2001.  “Is  There  an  Environmental  Kuznets  Curve  for 
Sulfur?”  Journal of Environmental Economics and Environmental Management, 41(2): 162-
178. 
 
Suresh, Babu S. V., Bharat L. Seth, Ajit Chak, Vasudha K. Dixit, and Sunita Narain. Sewage 
Canal: How to Clean the Yamuna. New Delhi: Centre for Science & Environment, 2007. 
 
Takeuchi,  Akie,  Maureen  Cropper,  and  Antonio  Bento.  2007.    “The  Impact  of  Policies  to 
Control Motor Vehicle Emissions in Mumbai, India.”  Journal of Regional Science, 47(1): 27–
46. Figure 1: Comparison of Pollution Levels in India, China, and the U.S.
Panel A:  Air Pollution Levels
Panel B:  Water Pollution Levels
Notes:  
1. In Panel A, the air pollution values are calculated from 1990-1995 data. For India, only cities with at least
seven years of data are used. In Panel B, water pollution values for India and the United States are calculated
from 1998-2002 data. For India, only city-rivers with at least seven years of data are used. Pollution values for
China are calculated across six major river systems for the year 1995 and are weighted by number of monitoring
sites within each river system.   Fecal coliform data for China were unavailable.
2. "Particulate Matter" refers to all particles with diameter less than 100 μm, except in the case of the United
States, where particle size is limited to diameter less than 50 μm.
3. Units are mg/l for Biochemical Oxygen Demand and Dissolved Oxygen. For Logarithm of Fecal Coliforms,
units are the most probable number of fecal coliform bacteria per 100 ml of water or MPN/100 ml. An increase
in Biochemical Oxygen Demand or Fecal Coliforms signals higher levels of pollution, while an increase in
Dissolved Oxygen signals lower levels of pollution.
4. Indian pollution data (both air and water) were drawn from the Central Pollution Control Board's online and
print sources. Data for the United States (both air and water pollution) were obtained from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency. Air pollution data for China came from the World Bank and China's State
Environmental Protection Agency. Doug Almond graciously provided these data. Chinese water pollution data
come from the World Bank; Avi Ebenstein graciously provided them.Notes:
Figure 2:  Air Quality Monitors Across India
1. Dots denote cities with monitoring stations under India's National Ambient Air
Quality Monitoring Programme (NAAQMP).
2. Geographical data are drawn from MIT's Geodata Repository. Monitoring locations
are determined from CPCB and SPCB online sources and Google Maps.
Figure 3:  Water Quality Monitors on India's Major Rivers
Notes:
2. Geographical data are drawn from MIT's Geodata Repository. Monitoring locations
are determined from CPCB and SPCB online sources and Google Maps.
1. Dots denote cities with monitoring stations under India's National Water Monitoring
Programme (NWMP). Only cities with monitors on major rivers are included, as
geospatial data for smaller rivers is unavailable.Year All Cities SCAP Cat Conv All Cities NRCP
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b)
1986 -- -- -- 104 0
1987 20 0 0 115 0
1988 25 0 0 191 0
1989 31 0 0 218 0
1990 44 0 0 271 0
1991 47 0 0 267 0
1992 58 0 0 287 0
1993 65 0 0 305 10
1994 57 0 0 316 10
1995 42 0 2 317 38
1996 68 0 4 316 39
1997 73 1 4 326 43
1998 65 1 22 325 43
1999 74 1 26 320 43
2000 66 1 24 303 39
2001 54 1 19 363 43
2002 63 1 22 376 41
2003 72 11 25 382 42
2004 78 15 24 395 41
2005 93 16 24 295 38
2006 112 16 24 -- --
2007 115 16 24 -- --
Notes: 
1. Columns (1a) and (2a) tabulate the total number of cities in each year, while columns (1b),
(1c), and (2b) tabulate the number of cities with the specified policy in place in each year.
2. We subject the full sample to two restrictions before analysis, both of which are applied here.
(1) If there is pollution data from a city after it has enacted a policy, then that city is only
included if it has at least one data point three years or more before policy uptake and four years
or more after policy uptake. (2) If there is no post-policy pollution data in a city (or if that city
never enacted the policy), then that city is only included if it has at least two pollution data
points.
3. In this table, a city is counted if it has any pollution data in that year. A city is only included
in the subsequent regressions if it has pollution data for the specific dependent variable of that
given regression. Thus, the above city counts must be interpreted as maximums in the
regressions. Most city-years have available data for all pollutants studied here.
4. The data were compiled by the authors from Central Pollution Control Board's online
sources, print sources, and interviews.
Table 1: Prevalence of Air and Water Policies
Water AirFigure 4: Trends in Air and Water Quality
Panel A:  Air Pollution
Panel B:  Water Quality
Panel C:  Infant Mortality
Notes:
3. Pollution data were drawn from Central Pollution Control Board's online and print sources. Infant mortality data were taken from
the book Vital Statistics of India as well as various state registrar's offices.
1. The figures depict annual mean pollution levels. There are no restrictions on the sample. Annual means are first taken across all
monitors within a given city, and then across all cities in a given year. 
2. Infant mortality data are restricted to those cities which have at least one air or water pollution measurement in the full sample.Period Mean
10th 
Percentile
90th 
Percentile Mean
10th 
Percentile
90th 
Percentile Mean
10th 
Percentile
90th 
Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PM SO₂ NO₂
Full Period 223.3 90.5 378.4 17.3 4.0 35.4 26.8 10.0 48.7
(114.0) (15.2) (18.0)
1370 1344 1382
1987-1990 252.1 101.6 384.3 19.4 4.4 38.2 25.5 8.5 42.6
(126.4) (13.3) (21.5)
120 116 117
2004-2007 209.5 92.0 366.6 12.2 4.0 23.0 25.6 10.4 47.0
(97.1) (8.1) (14.0)
420 381 417
BOD Ln(FColi) DO
Full Period 4.2 0.8 7.0 5.4 1.9 9.0 7.1 5.7 8.5
(8.0) (2.7) (1.3)
5949 4986 5920
1986-1989 3.5 0.9 5.8 6.4 3.6 9.7 7.2 6.0 8.5
(6.9) (2.3) (1.2)
644 529 648
2002-2005 4.1 0.9 7.9 5.3 1.8 9.1 7.0 5.5 8.4
(7.9) (2.9) (1.5)
1509 1340 1487
IM Rate
Full Period 23 3 46
(22.1)
1246
1987-1990 30 5 56
(31.5)
357
2001-2004 17 3 36
(14.1)
216
Notes:
3. Pollution data were drawn from Central Pollution Control Board's online and print sources. Infant mortality data were taken from the book Vital 
Statistics of India  as well as various state registrar's offices.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Air Pollution
Panel B:  Water Quality
Panel C: Infant Mortality
1. This table provides summary statistics on air and water quality. Standard deviations are provided below the mean in parantheses. 
2. Infant mortality data are restricted to those cities which have at least one air or water pollution measurement in the full sample.Figure 5A:  Kernel Density Graphs of Ambient Air Quality
Notes: 
1. The graphs provide the distribution of air pollution for the early (1987-
1990) and later (2004-2007) periods of our sample. They are constructed
using an Epanechnikov kernel function.
2. Units are μg/m³ for all pollutants.
3. The data were drawn from Central Pollution Control Board's online and
print sources.Figure 5B: Kernel Density Graphs of Surface Water Quality
Notes:
1. The graphs provide the distribution of water pollution for the early (1986-1989) and later
(2002-2005) periods of our sample. They are constructed using an Epanechnikov kernel 
2. Units are mg/l for BOD and DO, and Ln(MPN/100 ml) for FColi.
3. The right tail of the BOD distribution extends to 100 mg/l but is truncated to provide a more
detailed picture of the distribution.
4. The data were drawn from Central Pollution Control Board's online and print sources.Notes:
Figure 5C: Kernel Density Graphs of Infant Mortality
1. The graph provides the distribution of infant mortality for the early (1987-1990) and later 
(2001-2004) periods of our sample. They are constructed using an Epanechnikov kernel 
function.
2. Infant mortality data are restricted to those cities which have at least one air or water
pollution measurement in the full sample.
3. Units of infant mortality rate are Deaths per 1000 Births.
4. The right tail of the IM distrbution extends above 100 but is truncated to provide a more
detailed picture of the distribution.
5. The data were drawn from the book Vital Statistics of India as well as various state
registrar's offices.
detailed picture of the distribution.Figure 6. Event Study of Air Pollution Policies
Panel A. PM Panel B. SO2 Panel C. NO2
Notes: The figures provide a graphical analysis of the effect of the Supreme Court Action Plans and mandated Catalytic Converter policies on air
pollution. The figures plot the estimated στ's against the τ's from the estimation of equation (1). Each pair of graphs within a panel are based on the same
regression.  See the text for further details. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time Trend -3.8 -3.6 0.2 0.2 1.2** 1.4**
(2.4) (2.8) (0.1) (0.1) (0.4) (0.4)
1(Policy) -16.2 4.9 7.5 -0.5 -1.5* -1.4 1.9 -4.4 -1.7
(9.4) (15.8) (20.6) (0.4) (0.7) (0.9) (2.0) (2.7) (3.1)
1(Policy) * Time Trend -1.5 -0.1 -1.6
(7.1) (0.3) (1.1)
5-Year Effect -0.2 -1.7 -9.8*
p-value 0.99 0.21 0.06
N 1 11 11 1 1 11 11 1 1 11 11 1
Time Trend -0.3 7.8*** 0.1 2.0*** -0.3 0.9*
(1.8) (2.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
1(Policy) 11.9 14.7 5.6 2.5 1.5 -0.5 2.2 4.5 3.2
(8.8) (17.4) (12.8) (1.7) (3.3) (1.5) (1.4) (2.8) (2.2)
1(Policy) * Time Trend -10.8*** -2.6*** -1.5***
(2.9) (0.3) (0.5)
5-Year Effect -48.6*** -13.4*** -4.5
p-value 0.04 0.00 0.25
N 1 71 71 7 1 71 71 7 1 71 71 7
Equation (2a) Y N N Y N N Y N N
Equation (2b) N Y N N Y N N Y N
Equation (2c) N N Y N N Y N N Y
Table 3. Trend Break Estimates of the Effect of Policy on Air Pollution
Notes: This table reports results from the estimation of equations (2a), (2b), and (2c). Panel A reports on the estimated impact of the Supreme
Court Action Plans for PM (columns (1) – (3)), SO2 (columns (4) – (6)), and NO2 (columns (7) – (9)). Panel B reports on the same exercise,
except for the catalytic converter policy. Rows denoted "5-Year Effect" report Π1 +5 Π3, which is an estimate of the effect of the relevant policy 5
years after implementation from equation (2c). The p-value of a hypothesis test for the significance of this linear combination is reported
immediately below the 5-year estimates. Asterisks denote significance at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) levels. See the text for further
details.
Panel B: Catalytic Converters
PM SO₂ NO₂
Panel A: Supreme Court Action PlansNotes: The figures provide a graphical analysis of the effect of the National River Conservation Plan policy on water pollution. The figures plot the
estimated στ's against the τ's from the estimation of equation (1).  See the text for further details.
Figure 7. Event Study of Water Pollution Policy
Panel A. BOD Panel B. Ln(Fcoli) Panel C. DO(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time Trend -0.12 -0.88** 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.09***
(0.18) (0.34) (0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
1(NRCP) -1.11 -0.06 1.07 -0.08 -0.14 -0.01 0.04 0.19 0.03
(0.99) (1.88) (1.67) (0.20) (0.39) (0.40) (0.10) (0.18) (0.12)
1(NRCP) * Time Trend 0.96** 0.11 -0.13***
(0.38) (0.09) (0.03)
5-Year Effect 5.87* 0.54 -0.62***
p-value 0.06 0.45 0.01
N 1 81 81 8 1 81 81 8 1 81 81 8
Equation (2a) Y N N Y N N Y N N
Equation (2b) N Y N N Y N N Y N
Equation (2c) N N Y N N Y N N Y
Table 4. Trend Break Estimates of the Effect of the National River Conservation Policy on Water Pollution
BOD Ln(Fcoli) DO
Notes: This table reports estimates of the impact of the National River Conservation Policy on three measures of water pollution from the fitting of
equations (2a), (2b), and (2c). The three measures of water pollution are BOD (columns (1) – (3)), Ln(Fcoli) (columns (4) – (6)), and DO
(columns (7) – (9)). The row denoted "5-Year Effect" reports Π1 +5 Π3, which is an estimate of the effect of the relevant policy 5 years after
implementation from equation (2c). The p-value of a hypothesis test for the significance of this linear combination is reported immediately below
the 5-year estimates.  Asterisks denote significance at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) levels.  See the text for further details.Figure 8. Event Study of Catalytic Converters and Infant Mortality
Notes: The figure provides a graphical analysis of the effect of the Catalytic Converter
policy on the infant mortality rate. The figure plots the estimated στ's against the τ's from
the estimation of equation (1).  See the text for further details.(1) (2) (3)
Time Trend -0.40** -0.25
(0.16) (0.15)
1(Policy) -1.55 1.67 3.49**
(0.97) (1.53) (1.49)
1(Policy) * Time Trend -0.87**
(0.36)
5-Year Effect -0.86
p-value 0.61
N 16 16 16.00
Equation (2a) Y N N
Equation (2b) N Y N
Equation (2c) N N Y
Table 5. Trend Break Estimates of the Effect of the Catalytic 
Converter Policy on Infant Mortality
Notes: This table reports estimates of the impact of the Catalytic Converter
Policy on infant mortality rates from the fitting of equations (2a), (2b), and
(2c). The row denoted "5-Year Effect" reports Π1 +5 Π3, which is an
estimate of the effect of the relevant policy 5 years after implementation
from equation (2c). The p-value of a hypothesis test for the significance of
this linear combination is reported immediately below the 5-year estimates.
Asterisks denote significance at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***)
levels.  See the text for further details.Panel C: Infant Mortality
Year PM SO₂ NO₂ BOD Ln(Fcoli) DO IMR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1986 -- -- -- 4.0 6.1 7.4 --
-- -- -- 111 100 110 --
1987 279.3 21.0 29.3 3.8 6.5 7.2 35.9
20 17 18 122 101 119 87
1988 243.6 18.7 23.2 3.2 6.3 7.2 30.6
25 25 25 190 162 195 87
1989 245.7 18.2 26.2 3.3 6.7 7.2 28.2
31 31 31 221 166 224 87
1990 249.1 19.9 24.9 3.9 6.6 7.2 24.4
44 43 43 273 205 275 96
1991 256.2 20.3 28.8 3.8 5.6 7.2 26.9
47 46 45 264 212 268 80
1992 223.5 20.9 28.5 4.4 6.1 7.2 26.2
58 57 57 287 206 286 76
1993 257.2 22.5 27.9 4.6 5.9 7.3 25.3
66 64 63 307 246 308 79
1994 249.3 22.2 28.5 4.1 5.7 7.3 22.8
58 65 65 327 256 324 78
1995 216.0 22.2 23.3 4.7 5.1 7.1 21.7
42 41 43 327 285 327 79
1996 244.9 21.9 25.9 4.7 4.9 7.2 22.3
70 68 68 328 279 326 58
1997 213.6 23.6 30.0 4.4 4.9 7.1 19.6
76 72 72 338 290 335 59
1998 229.8 21.7 27.7 4.1 4.9 7.1 18.7
68 66 66 329 282 334 58
1999 221.5 22.1 29.1 4.4 4.9 7.1 18.2
77 75 75 326 265 324 55
2000 193.5 16.7 27.8 4.0 4.9 7.1 18.1
68 71 71 313 270 311 52
2001 223.0 14.7 27.3 4.2 5.1 7.1 17.8
57 69 70 377 321 367 63
2002 189.4 13.0 26.7 4.6 5.2 7.1 15.7
67 77 77 389 335 380 61
2003 230.3 11.9 26.5 4.2 5.1 7.0 17.6
76 76 76 393 350 382 62
2004 222.0 11.6 26.1 3.7 5.1 6.9 14.6
82 85 85 417 370 417 30
2005 210.6 12.7 26.7 4.1 5.9 7.1 --
97 86 93 310 285 308 --
2006 202.9 12.0 25.0 -- -- -- --
116 104 115 -- -- -- --
2007 206.7 12.4 24.9 -- -- -- --
125 106 124 -- -- -- --
Notes:  
4. Pollution data were drawn from Central Pollution Control Board's online and print sources. Infant mortality data were
taken from the book Vital Statistics of India  as well as various state registrar's offices.
Appendix Table 1:  Summary Statistics, by Year
Panel A: Air Quality Panel B: Water Quality
1. The figures depict annual mean pollution levels. There are no restrictions on the sample. Annual means are first taken
across all monitors within a given city, and then across all cities in a given year. 
2. Number of city-year observations is reported below the mean in each year.
3. Units are ug/m³ for all air pollutants; mg/l for BOD and DO; Ln(MPN/100 ml) for Fcoli; and Deaths per 1000 Births for
infant mortality.Water
Year
Supreme Court 
Action Plans
Catalytic 
Converters
National River 
Conservation Plan
(1) (4) (6)
1986 -- -- 25
1987 0 0 25
1988 0 0 25
1989 0 0 25
1990 0 0 25
1991 0 0 25
1992 0 0 25
1993 0 0 25
1994 0 0 97
1995 0 0 160
1996 0 4 160
1997 0 4 160
1998 1 4 160
1999 1 49 160
2000 1 49 160
2001 1 49 160
2002 1 49 160
2003 12 49 160
2004 17 49 160
2005 17 49 160
2006 17 49 --
2007 17 49 --
Notes:
Appendix Table 2: Pollution Policy Coverage in India
1. This table describes the incidence of each policy across all of India.
2. Policy data were drawn from a variety of sources that are detailed
in the text.
AirWater
Relative 
Year
Supreme Court 
Action Plans Catalytic Converters
National River 
Conservation  Plan
(1) (4) (6)
-17 1 0 0
-16 6 0 0
-15 6 0 0
-14 10 0 0
-13 12 0 0
-12 12 0 0
-11 12 5 0
-10 14 8 0
-9 13 10 13
-8 10 19 14
-7 16 20 26
-6 17 22 30
-5 17 23 37
-4 17 18 37
-3 16 18 41
-2 17 26 39
-1 17 26 36
01 7 2 0 4 2
11 6 2 6 4 2
21 7 2 4 4 2
31 7 1 9 3 9
41 2 2 2 4 3
5 1 25 43
6 1 24 43
7 1 24 39
8 1 24 42
9 1 24 39
10 1 4 38
11 0 4 11
12 0 4 11
Notes: 
5. Policy data are drawn from a variety of sources detailed in the text.
2. Cities which enact a policy are subjected to the same inclusion rules as in event
study analysis. That is, a city is only included here if it has at least one pollution
data point 3 years or more before policy uptake as well as at least one data point 4
years or more after policy uptake.
Appendix Table 3: Distribution of Air and Water Policies, by 
Relative Year
Air
1. This table describes the prevalence of policies in the dataset by year relative to
policy uptake. Thus, a value of '-17' in the first column signifies '17 years before a
policy is implemented'. We use relative year ('tau') as the year variable in event
study regressions and figures.
3. In this table, a city is counted if it has any pollution data in that year. In
analyses, a city is only used if it has pollution data for the specific dependent
variable in a given regression. Thus, the above city counts must be interpreted as
maximums among our regressions. Most city-years have available data for all
pollutants studied here.
4. Since infant mortality data is only available up to the year 2004, the table above
is not representative for analysis which uses infant mortality as the dependent
variable.